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I. INTRODUCTION
When a court enters a valid judgment against an asbestos manufac-
turer for personal injury, the plaintiffs in the lawsuit understandably
desire to collect their judgment right then and there.' Instead, the as-
bestos manufacturer appeals the decision and has a surety post a bond
to protect the plaintiffs' right to the judgment should the asbestos man-
ufacturer be financially unable to pay it.2 On appeal, the higher court
affirms and the plaintiffs seek to collect the money from the defendant
only to find that the defendant has filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy' peti-
tion in another state.4 Unable to collect the judgment from the defen-
dant, the plaintiffs turn to the surety that posted the bond, only to find
that the foreign bankruptcy court has issued an injunction preventing
the plaintiffs from collecting their judgment from the non-bankrupt
surety as well.5 The frustrated plaintiffs then seek an order from the
trial court in which the judgment was entered allowing them to proceed
against the surety.' Disregarding the foreign bankruptcy court's injunc-
tion, the court grants the plaintiffs' request7 so that the plaintiffs may
finally proceed against the surety to collect their money, right? Wrong.
The trial court's order constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on
the bankruptcy court injunction. Even though the plaintiffs may have
had a reasonable basis with which to attack the injunction, they must
1. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct 1493, 1496 (1995).
2. See id.
3. Bankruptcy Code of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
4. See Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1496-97.
5. See id. at 1497.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id, at 1501.
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pursue their remedy in the bankruptcy court 9 This is the holding of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Celotex Corp. v. Edwards."0
In Celotex, the Court confronted facts similar to those summarized
above." Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the seven-to-two majority,
held that the issue of whether the plaintiffs could proceed against the
surety was a question "related to" Celotex's bankruptcy, and the bank-
ruptcy court therefore had jurisdiction to enter the injunction. 2 The
Court reasoned that allowing the plaintiffs and other similarly situated
judgment creditors to proceed on the bonds would have a negative
impact on Celotex's ability to undertake its Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion." The Court noted that the bankruptcy jurisdictional grant envi-
sioned by Congress was broad and that under these circumstances the
bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction was not improper. 4 Addi-
tionally, the Court held that where a court has jurisdiction to enter an
injunction, parties subject to the injunction are required to abide by the
injunction until it is lifted. 5 This principle applies even where a party
subject to the injunction has a proper basis to object to the injunc-
tion.' Chief Justice Rehnquist was careful to emphasize that the Court
was not deciding the merits of the injunction issued by the bankruptcy
court; the ruling merely required that the aggrieved parties challenge
the injunction where it was entered-in the bankruptcy court 7
This Note acknowledges that the Court reached the correct result in
disallowing a collateral attack on a bankruptcy court order. Nonethe-
less, the Court's decision leaves several important questions unan-
swered. First, when analyzing the jurisdictional scope of the bankruptcy
court, the mjority failed to resolve the conflict among the circuits with
respect to which test of bankruptcy jurisdiction is controlling.8 The
Court utilized the broad Pacor test 9 to examine the propriety of the
9. See id
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1496-98.
12. Id. at 1499.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1498 (citing GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 445 U.S. 375,
386 (1980)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1501.
18. Id. at 1499 n.6; id. at 1504 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra notes 291-93
and accompanying text.
19. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1499. Under the Pacor test, a dispute is related to a
debtor's bankruptcy If "the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any
effect on the estate .... An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could
alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action ... and which in
any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the bankrupt estate." Pacor,
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bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction, but did not adopt it nor ex-
pressly reject the more narrow test applied in other circuits.' This
lack of resolution may lead to inconsistent results.21 In addition to this
failure to resolve the conflict among the circuits, the majority opinion
does not adequately address the constitutional issues raised in Justice
Stevens's dissent." Because the bankruptcy court jurisdictional
scheme as it was originally devised failed to pass constitutional mus-
ter,' Justice Stevens's dissent has special significance. Finally, Celotex
likely will impact the issuance of supersedeas bonds, i.e., bonds that
are posted when a party petitions a court to set aside a judgment.' An
argument can be made that because supersedeas bonds put the "integri-
ty of the Court... on the line," any questions regarding their enforce-
ability should be answered by the issuing court only.' Reducing the
availability of these bonds and the probable extension of the Celotex
reasoning to letter of credit transactions may have negative consequenc-
es for commercial transactions.'
Part 11 of this Note discusses the historical background of the issues
involved in this case, including the evolution of bankruptcy jurisdiction,
the development of the collateral attack rule, and the concept of super-
sedeas bonds.' Part El contains a detailed explanation of the factual
development of the Celotex litigation.' Part IV analyzes the majority
Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984) (emphasis in original) (citations omit-
ted).
20. The Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have adopted a more narrow test for
whether a matter falls within a bankruptcy court's "related to" jurisdiction. Fietz v.
Great W. Says., 852 F.2d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 1988). The more narrow formulation
would deny bankruptcy jurisdiction when a matter is "'conceivably' related to the
bankruptcy estate, but that relationship is remote." Id.; see Elscint, Inc. v. First Wis.
Fin. Corp. (In re Xonics, Inc.), 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1987); Kelley v. Nodine (In re
Salem Mortgage Co.), 783 F.2d 626, 634 (6th Cir. 1986); Turner v. Ermiger (In re
Turner), 724 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1983).
21. See iqfra notes 291-93 and accompanying text.
22. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1501-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
23. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71
(1982) (holding that the original bankruptcy jurisdictional grant violated the separation
of powers by allowing non-Article I courts to adjudicate issues too distant from the
"core" of the bankruptcy).
24. See FED. R CIv. P. 62.
25. Celotex, 115 S. Ct aV 1510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
*26. See ifra notes 296-308 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 32-108 and accompanying text.
28. See itfra notes 109-48 and accompanying text.
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and the dissenting opinion.' Part V explores Celote.'s probable im-
pact' Finally, this Note concludes with a brief summary in Part VIV
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Collatera Attack Rule
As a general rule, when a court issues an injunction, parties subject
to the order may not collaterally attack that judgment in a separate
proceeding." The objecting party may, of course, seek to overturn the
order via appeal to a higher court, but the party cannot ignore the judg-
ment and then attack its merits in another forum.' The rationale for
this rule is that "respect for judicial process" requires that parties obey
court orders, regardless of their merits, until the order has been proper-
ly reversed.' The general prohibition against collateral attack is, how-
ever, subject to three exceptions.' When a court lacks jurisdiction
over the parties, lacks subject matter jurisdiction, or when the injunc-
tion has only a "frivolous pretense to validity," a party may collaterally
attack the order.' The first two exceptions stem from the traditional
rule that an order entered by a court without jurisdiction is void.37
These exceptions serve as a check on courts that attempt to exercise
power in excess of the power granted to them.'
29. See infru notes 149-278 and accompanying text.
30. See iviu notes 279-308 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 309-14 and accompanying text.
32. Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922). The rule is often stated as fol-
lows:
It is for the court of first instance to determine the question of the validity
of the law, and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review,
either by itself or by a higher court, its orders based on its decision are to




34. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 321 (1967).
35. Id. at 315.
36. Id.
37. Edward P. Krugman, Note, Miing the Void, Judicial Power and Jurisdictional
Attacks on Judgments, 87 YALE LI. 164, 164 (1977). Where a court exceeds its grant
of power, "[elvery exertion of authority beyond this limit is a mere nullity, and inca-
pable of binding such persons or property in any other tribunals." Picquet v. Swan,
19 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 11,134).
38. Krugman, supra note 37, at 164. One observer has argued that the "voidness"
doctrine should be abolished because the identity of the issuing court is unimportant
and is nonetheless outweighed by the interest in favor of finality of judgments. Id. at
164-65.
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The collateral attack rule has been applied in the bankruptcy con-
text.1 The Supreme Court has held that a bankruptcy court order sus-
tained on appeal, even if erroneous, is entitled to res judicata effect and
is not subject to collateral attack' Additionally, the bankruptcy court
has the power to determine whether it has jurisdiction over an issue;
therefore, if not reversed on appeal, an order entered by a bankruptcy
court that lacked subject matter jurisdiction will also be final The
Court has stated its reasoning as follows:
After a party has his day in court, with opportunity to present his evidence and
his view of the law, a collateral attack upon the decision as to jurisdiction there
rendered merely retries the issue previously determined. There is no reason to
expect that the second decision will be more satisfactory than the flrstY
B. Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
The jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court has changed dramatically
since the passage of the original bankruptcy laws in 1898.' These
changes stem from persistent practical and constitutional flaws in the
jurisdictional framework devised and amended by Congress." Under the
old Bankruptcy Act, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court was limited
in that jurisdiction depended on possession of the debtor's property.'
39. See, e.g., Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 377
(1940) (holding that a bankruptcy court order sustaining its own jurisdiction may not
be collaterally attacked); Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1929) (holding that a
bankruptcy court order requiring turnover must be appealed directly rather than via
collateral attack).
40. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938); Republic Supply Co. v. Shoaf,
815 F.2d 1046, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1987). See generally MARK S. ScARBERRY ET AL., Busi-
NS REORGANIZATION IN BANKRUPTCY 973 (1996) (discussing the res judicata effect
given to bankruptcy court judgments despite the lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
41. Stoll, 305 U.S. at 171 (holding that a bankruptcy court has the power to "inter-
pret the language of the jurisdictional instrument and its application to an issue"); see
Republic Supply Co., 815 F.2d at 1052-53 (holding that as long as a party had an op-
portunity to raise a jurisdictional question, the judgment is res judicata and not sub-
ject to collateral attack).
42. Stoll, 305 U.S. at 172.
43. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Sta 544 (repealed 1978).
44. See Robert J. Shapiro, Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Under the 1984 Amendments:
One Step Backward, One Step Forward, 3 BANER. DEv. J. 127, 127 (1986) (discussing
congressional attempts to resolve the consistent problems with the bankruptcy court's
jurisdictional grant).
45. See Howard C. Buschman HI & Sean P. Madden, The Power and Propriety of
Bankruptcy Court Intervention in Actions Between Nondebtors, 47 Bus. LAw. 913,
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This limited jurisdictional grant was the source of inefficiency in resolv-
ing matters that were related to the debtor's bankruptcy.' Indeed, the
problems associated with the old jurisdictional scheme were a primary
motivation for reform and the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in
1978.'"
The new Bankruptcy Code (Code) substantially enlarged the bankrupt-
cy court's power." Under the Code, the district court exercised original
jurisdiction over all bankruptcy cases arising in its district;' however,
the bankruptcy court for the district would "exercise all of the jurisdic-
tion conferred... on the district courts."' Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court was indirectly given the power to adjudicate all proceedings "aris-
ing under," "arising in," or "related to" a debtor's bankruptcy."1 Under
this scheme, the bankruptcy court essentially exercised exclusive juris-
diction over bankruptcy cases arising in its district.' By this expansive
grant of jurisdiction, Congress intended to eliminate the confusion and
conflict that accompanied the former scheme.'
Although Congress greatly increased the scope of the bankruptcy
courts' power, Congress did not upgrade their status from Article I to
Article Ill courts." This decision proved problematic a few years later
916 (1992) (discussing the evolution of bankruptcy court jurisdiction from the narrow
in rem theory of the Act to the broad grant of the Code).
46. I&
47. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 3.01[1][a] (Lawrence
P. King et al. eds., 16th ed. 1996).
48. Buschman & Madden, supra note 45, at 916.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982), repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
50. Id, § 1471(c), repealed by Pub. L No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
51. Id. § 1471(b), repealed by Pub. L No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984). -Arising
under title 11" jurisdiction permitted the bankruptcy court to hear all claims based
explicitly on the rights and duties created under the Code. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at
445-46 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6400-01. The "arising under or
related to" language granted jurisdiction over disputes that have some connection to
the case under title 11. Id.
52. Buschman & Madden, supra note 45, at 917.
53. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 127. Congress hoped that this regime would elimi-
nate all uncertainty regarding the range of the bankruptcy court's power. H.R. REP.
No. 95-595, at 42-52 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6003-13.
54. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 127. An Article M court is characterized by judges
who are appointed for life and whose salaries are protected from diminution. U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 1. The power to create bankruptcy courts, by contrast, is derived
from Article 1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Clause 4 states that Congress can pass
"uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies." Id. The House of Representatives ar-
gued that, for constitutional and practical reasons, the expanded jurisdictional grant
required that the bankruptcy courts be given Article 11 status. Walter J. Taggart, The
New Bankruptcy Court System, 59 AM. BANKL. LJ. 231, 233 (1985). The Senate de-
sired a system of non-Article 11 judges appointed for 12-year terms. Id. The Senate
proposal ultimately became the law, with the minor compromise that the judges be
1044
[VoL 24: 1039, 19971 Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
when a plurality of the Supreme Court declared this jurisdictional
scheme unconstitutional because it improperly transferred Article I
powers to a non-Article I court.' The precise meaning of the Supreme
Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co. was not initially apparent.'M Nevertheless, the Court clear-
ly objected to the bankruptcy court's exercise of jurisdiction over pro-
ceedings that were distant from the "core" of traditional bankruptcy
powers."7 For example, in Northern Pipeline the jurisdictional grant
permitted the bankruptcy court to adjudicate a state law breach of con-
tract action raised by the debtor.M In rejecting the bankruptcy court's
authority to determine the contract action, the Court drew a distinction
between the "restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the
core of the federal bankruptcy power," and "the adjudication of state-
created private rights," such as a contract action, which is outside the
appointed for 14-year terms. Id. at 234. For a discussion of the merits of the
protections afforded by Article 1II, see David P. Currie, Bankruptcy Judges and the
Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGHTON L REv. 441, 442 (1983).
55. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 74
(1982). In Northern Pipeline, debtor Northern Pipeline sought relief under Chapter 11
and subsequently filed an adversary proceeding against Marathon asserting state law
contract causes of action. Id. at 56. These claims were to be heard in the bankruptcy
court because they were "related to" Northern Pipeline's bankruptcy. Id. Marathon ob-
jected on the ground that a non-Article I31 judge could not constitutionally hear the
case. Id. at 56-57. As one observer noted, the reason for the objection was that
"Congress had entrusted the trial and decision of all civil controversies affecting a
bankrupt to a set of judges enjoying neither life tenure nor irreducible salary." Currie,
supra note 54, at 442.
56. Buschnman & Madden, supra note 45, at 918; see Shapiro, supra note 44, at
140 (discussing the uncertainty created by Northern Pipeline). After Northern Pipe-
line, courts disagreed over whether the decision invalidated only the bankruptcy
court's exercise of jurisdiction or the entire jurisdictional scheme established by the
Code, including the district court's jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases. See, e.g., In re
Conley, 26 B.R 885, 893 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1983) (holding that the entire jurisdic-
tional scheme under § 1471 was unconstitutional after Northern Pipeline). But see,
e.g., In re Kaiser, 722 F.2d 1574, 1577 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that Northern Pipeline
invalidated the jurisdictional grant as to the bankruptcy court but not as to the dis-
trict court). One observer has commented that the former view was the "vast minori-
ty" and the latter view was the majority consensus regarding the meaning of North-
ern Pipeline. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 141.
57. Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71. The Court stated that the constitutional
problem stemmed from the fact that the scheme "impermissibly removed most, if not
all, of 'the essential attributes of the judicial power' from the Art. HIl district court,
and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. M adjunct." Id. at 87.
58. Id. at 56.
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core of this power.' The Court reasoned that the range of issues a
bankruptcy court could decide under its "related to" jurisdiction was so
broad that the grant impermissibly circumvented the constitutional
protections provided by independent Article Ill courts.' The Court
stayed the effect of its decision for four months to afford Congress the
opportunity to remedy the defects in the jurisdictional grant.6"
In Northern Pipeline's wake, and before Congress amended the Code,
the bankruptcy system needed an interim solution to continue function-
ing.' The Judicial Conference of the United States responded by prepar-
ing emergency rules that addressed the constitutional concerns raised in
Northern Pipeline.' Every circuit adopted these rules." The emergen-
cy rules assumed that Northern Pipeline had invalidated only the juris-
dictional grant to the bankruptcy court and that, consequently, the dis-
trict court's grant of jurisdiction remained valid.' From that perspec-
tive, the rules established a system that granted the bankruptcy court ju-
risdiction derived from the district court's grant.' The rules permitted
the bankruptcy court to exercise binding judgments in traditional bank-
ruptcy matters subject to de novo review by the district court.67 In mat-
ters outside the traditional realm of bankruptcy matters, yet still "related
to" the bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court was given limited power to
issue recommendations regarding a final disposition that the district
court was required to review de novo.68
The emergency rules governed bankruptcy proceedings for eighteen
months before Congress responded to Northern Pipeline via the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (BAFJA). To
address the concerns raised by Northern Pipeline, Congress had to
choose between either conferring Article EII status on bankruptcy court
judges or devising a scheme that preserved the independence of the
Article III courts while decreasing the authority of the bankruptcy
59. Id. at 71.
60. Id. at 74. Specifically, the Court worried that the creation of "specialized"
courts under Article I would serve as a vehicle to encroach on the judicial power of
Article IH courts. Id. This development would violate the separation of powers and
dilute the independence of the judiciary sought by Article IIl. Id.
61. Id. at 88.
62. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 147.
63. 1 COWER ON BANKRUPrCY, supra note 47, 3.01[1][b][vi].
64. See Taggart, supra note 54, at 236; see also White Motor Corp. v. Citibank,
N.A., 704 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that each circuit accepted the rules
with only insignificant changes).
65. White Motor, 704 F.2d at 257.
66. Shapiro, supra note 44, at 149.
67. White Motor, 704 F.2d at 256-57.
68. Id
69. Pub. L No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
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courtm Congress chose the latter route and essentially adopted the ap-
proach utilized by the emergency rules.7 Under BAFJA, the district
courts were granted original jurisdiction over all matters "arising in,"
"arising under," and "related to" a bankruptcy.'m The district court then
has the power to delegate all or part of these matters to the bankruptcy
judge for the district." The bankruptcy court's power to act on the mat-
ter is determined by whether the matter is "core"74 or "non-core"' ac-
cording to the dichotomy established by Congress. Generally, core pro-
ceedings, do not exist outside of bankruptcy. 7 Core proceedings encom-
pass both "arising under" and "arising in" jurisdiction.' When a proceed-
ing "'invokes a substantive right provided by title 11,'" it falls within the
"arising under" grant and is a core proceeding.M When a proceeding "'by
its nature, could arise only in the context of a bankruptcy case,'" it is
within the "arising in" grant and is also a core proceeding. ' In such
70. See Taggart, supra note 54, at 238 (summarizing the legislative history of
BAFJA).
71. Buschman & Madden, supra note 45, at 918-19.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1994). The provision states in relevant part: "[T]he district
courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising
under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11." Id,
73. Id, § 157(a). The provision states in relevant part: "[E]ach district court may
provide that any or all cases under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under
title 11. . . shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district." Id.
74. Id. § 157(b)(1). The provision states:
Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all
core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11,
referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate or-
ders and judgments, subject to review under section 158 of this title.
Id.
75. Id. § 157(c)(1). The provision states:
A bankruptcy judge may hear a proceeding that is not a core proceeding but
that is otherwise related to a case under title 11. In such proceeding, the
bankruptcy judge shall submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law to the district court, and any final order or judgment shall be entered by
the district judge after considering the bankruptcy judge's proposed findings
and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those matters to which any
party has timely and specifically objected.
Id.
76. Buschnan & Madden, supra note 45, at 919. For a nonexhaustive list of core
proceedings, see 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A)-(O).
77. Buschman & Madden, supra note 45, at 919.
78. Id. (quoting Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987)).
79. Id. (quoting Wood, 825 F.2d at 97).
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core proceedings the bankruptcy court has the power to issue final judg-
ments, subject to review by appeal to the district court?' Proceedings
that are "related to" a bankruptcy case are non-core proceedings.8'1 Up-
on hearing these non-core matters, the bankruptcy court has power only
to make recommendations regarding findings of fact and conclusions of
law." These recommendations are subject to mandatory review by the
district court, which will enter the final judgment in the matter."
The Code does not specifically define the scope of "related to" jurisdic-
tion," and the courts are divided over the proper reach of the grant'
The majority of the circuits have adopted the standard articulated in
Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins.? In Pacor, the Third Circuit stated that a pro-
ceeding is within the "related to" jurisdiction when
the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the es-
tate .... An action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the
debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or neg-
atively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of
the bankrupt estate.-
By authorizing jurisdiction over any proceeding that could "conceivably
have any effect" on the bankruptcy, this test takes a broad view of the
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction.? The Pacor court qualified this inclusive
language by stating that "there must be some nexus" between the pro-
ceeding and the debtors bankruptcy.? Nonetheless, courts that have
adopted the Pacor test have applied the standard very broadly.'
80. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
81. Id. § 157(c)(1).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Buschnan & Madden, supra note 45, at 919.
85. Michael L. Cook, Overview of Bankruptcy Court Procedure: Jurisdiction, Ven-
ue and Appeals, in PRACTISING L INsT., Commercial Law and Practice Course Hand-
book Series, 714 P.LL Comm. L at 2 (1995).
86. 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984). The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth Circuits have adopted the Pacor standard for determining relatedness. See Cook,
supra note 85, at 2.
87. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
88. Buschman & Madden, supra note 45, at 926-27.
89. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994.
90. See, e.g., American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American
Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the bankruptcy
court had jurisdiction to permanently stay a creditor from enforcing a judgment
against a nondebtor); Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 94 (5th Cir. 1987)
(allowing jurisdiction over an arguably post-petition claim while acknowledging the
possibility that the proceeding could have no effect on the bankruptcy). For an argu-
ment that some courts have misconstrued Pacor, see Buschman & Madden, supra
note 45, at 926-27 & n.96.
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Five circuits have formulated a different standard for evaluating
whether a proceeding is within the "related to" grant. 1 This standard is
more narrow than the Pacor test.9' The test requires that the proceeding
have a "significant connection" to the debtor's bankruptcy case.' Ac-
cordingly, under the "significant connection" test, jurisdiction may be
denied when "the dispute's probable effect on the debtor's estate is con-
ceivable, but remote. "" The rationale underlying this test is the fear that
the Pacor standard, with its broad language, places no meaningful limita-
tions on the exercise of jurisdiction over matters "related to" the bank-
ruptcy.9 5
"Related to" jurisdiction is generally invoked in two scenarios.9 6 Juris-
diction is invoked either where the debtor's pre-bankruptcy causes of
action become property of the bankruptcy estate, or second, where law-
suits between third parties are asserted to have a relationship to the
debtor's bankruptcy. 7 The latter scenario has been a primary source of
debate concerning the extent of the "related to" jurisdictional grant.'
These disputes can involve actions by a debtor's creditors against non-
debtor guarantors.9 In these circumstances, the debtor argues that the
91. See Cook, supra note 85, at 7. The First, Second, Third, Seventh, and Tenth
Circuits apply the more narrow view of "related to" jurisdiction. l.
92. Buschman & Madden, supam note 45, at 928.
93. Turner v. Ermiger (In re Turner), 724 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1983).
94. Cook, supra note 85, at 2.
95. Holland Indus. v. United States (In re Holland Indus.), 103 B.R. 461, 468
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989). This concern has prompted some courts to take an even nar-
rower view of the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional reach, allowing jurisdiction only
when property of the estate was clearly involved in the action or when the resolu-
tion of the dispute was "required for the proper administration or reorganization of
the estate." Crown Cent Petroleum Corp. v. Wechter (In re General Oil Distrib., Inc.),
21 B.R. 888, 892 n.13 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
96. 1 COLLER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 47, 3.01[l)[c][iv].
97. Buschman & Madden, supra note 45, at 920.
98. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
99. Although courts are reluctant to enjoin actions against nondebtors, some cases
have resulted in the nondebtor receiving a permanent discharge. See, e.g., MacArthur
Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir.
1988) (holding that an injunction barring all suits against a debtor's insurers was
proper); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 1007-08
(4th Cir. 1986) (holding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to prevent a suit
against a debtor's directors, attorneys, and insurers); Otero Mills, Inc. v. Security
Bank & Trust (In re Otero Mills, Inc.), 21 B.R. 777, 779 (Bankr. D.N.M.) (allowing a
permanent injunction against a creditor seeking to collect from the nondebtor guaran-
tor), affd, 25 B.R. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982).
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automatic stay protects the non-debtor, or in the alternative, the debtor
will request that the bankruptcy court use its equitable powers to bar
collection activity against the non-debtor."° Bankruptcy courts exercis-
ing jurisdiction over these matters have justified the action on the
ground that resolution of the action against the non-debtor will impact
the debtor's ability to reorganize successfully. °1 In these cases, two is-
sues arise that overlap to a certain degree: first, whether the third party
action is sufficiently "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy to justify an
exercise of jurisdiction by the bankruptcy court,"° and second, if juris-
diction in fact exists, whether the bankruptcy court's use of its equitable
powers is proper."
C. Supersedeas Bonds
Supersedeas bonds are posted to protect a judgment creditor's right to
a judgment while the case is on appeal."° The supersedeas bond is de-
signed to shift the risk of the judgment debtor's insolvency from the
judgment creditor to a third party."° A similar device often used in the
business world is the letter of credit arrangement." Under the letter of
credit transaction, a customer contracts with a bank that promises to pay
a third party if the conditions identified in the agreement occur."° The
arrangement facilitates commerce by allowing the customer to substitute
the issuer's credit for its own."°
100. Kenneth M. Lewis, When Are Nondebtors Really Entitled to a Discharge: Set-
ting the Record Straight on Johns-Manville and AH. Robins, 3 J. BAoN.M L & PRAc.
163, 166 (1994).
101. See, e.g., In re ALH. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 1989) (Justifying a
stay against a third party to prevent an adverse impact on a debtor's reorganization);
American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods,
Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1989) (staying the enforcement of a state court
judgment in order to facilitate a debtor's reorganization plan).
102. See Buschman & Madden, supra note 46, at 920-21.
103. See Manuel D. Leal, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court.- Section 105, 29 S.
TEX L REV. 487, 496-504 (1988) (identifying both an expansive and restrictive ap-
proach to whether an action under § 105 is proper).
104. See Michael R. Smith, Obtaining a Supersedeas Bond, 23 Cow. LAW. 607, 607-
08 (1994).
105. Id.
106. Howard N. Gorney, Enjoining Payment of Letters of Credit Under the Bank-
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El. FACTUAL HISTORY OF CELOTEX
During his years as an insulation installer, Bennie Edwards was ex-
posed to asbestos and ultimately contracted asbestosis.' In April 1989,
after a five-day jury trial, Bennie and Joann Edwards recovered a judg-
ment against the Celotex Corporation in the amount of $281,025.80 for
asbestos-related injuries." ° This amount included $35,253.80 in com-
pensatory damages; however, the bulk of the damages resulted from the
jury's award of $245,500 in punitive damages."' Celotex appealed the
judgment"' and posted a supersedeas bond with the court in which the
judgment was entered, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas."' Northbrook Property and Casualty Insurance Com-
pany (Northbrook) acted as surety on the bond." 4 Celotex secured the
bond by resolving an insurance coverage dispute with Northbrook.". At
this time, Celotex was facing more than 141,000 lawsuits for asbestos
injuries and had stayed judgments totaling $70 million with supersedeas
bonds."8 Ironically, Celotex had not itself been an actual producer of
asbestos, but rather Celotex was held liable as a successor corporation." 7
109. Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., 911 F.2d 1151, 1152 (Sth Cir. 1990) (Ed-
wards 1).
110. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 1496 (1995).
111. Brief for Petitioner at 5, Celotex (No. 93-1504).
112. On appeal, Celotex argued that either only compensatory damages should be
awarded, or that the punitive damages award should be reduced. Edwards I, 911
F.2d at 1152.
113. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1496. Celotex posted the supersedeas bond pursuant to
the procedure established by the federal rules. Id. "When an appeal is taken the
appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay .... The stay is effective
when the supersedeas bond is approved by the court." FED. IR CIV. P. 62(d).
114. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1496.
115. Id. Northbrook was also Celotex's insurer, the security arrangement allowed
Northbrook to withhold funds that it owed Celotex as a result of the resolution of
insurance coverage disputes between the two companies. Id.
116. Id. at 1496 n.2.
117. See Edwards I, 911 F.2d at 1153.
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On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment against Celotex."8
Celotex did not seek a rehearing, and, consequently, on October 12, 1990,
a mandate issued for Celotex to pay the judgment... That same day, in
a Florida bankruptcy court, Celotex filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.' 2° Pursuant to the automatic stay,
the filing of the petition halted all collection activity against Celotex."2'
Five days later, under the authority of the bankruptcy court's equitable
powers,"' the court issued an injunction to supplement the protection
provided by the automatic stay."2' The order enjoined all proceedings
involving Celotex "regardless of... whether the matter is on appeal and
a supersedeas bond has been posted.""4 The order also stated that a
creditor could seek relief from the injunction by petitioning the bank-
ruptcy court for a hearing."
Subsequently, judgment creditors in essentially the same position as
the Edwardses sought relief from the injunction in the bankruptcy
court. 25 These creditors argued that because the supersedeas bonds
were not property of the bankruptcy estate, the bankruptcy court lacked
the power to prevent creditors from seeking to execute against the sure-
ty on the bonds."r7 The bankruptcy court disagreed and reasoned that
118. Id. The Fifth Circuit rejected Celotex's contentions that the punitive damages
were excessive. Id. at 1153-54. Although the court concluded that "multiple punitive
damage awards for a single course of conduct" do not violate the Due Process
Clause, the court did express "misgivings" about Celotex's seemingly limitless liability.
Id. at 1154-55. The court stated.
If no change occurs in our tort or constitutional law, the time will arrive
when Celotex's liability for punitive damages imperils its ability to pay com-
pensatory claims and its corporate existence. Neither the company's innocent
shareholders, employees and creditors, nor future asbestos claimants will
benefit from this death by attrition.
Id. at 1155.
119. Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 6 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1993) (Ed-
wards I), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995).
120. In re Celotex Corp., 128 B.R. 478, 479 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (Celotex 1).
121. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994). The automatic stay serves as an inunction against
"the commencement or continuation ... of a... proceeding... to recover a claim
against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title."
Id. § 362(a)(1). The stay applies to any action "to obtain possession of property of
the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate." Id. § 362(a)(3).
122. See id. § 105(a) ("The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.").
123. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 1496 (1995).
124. Id. at 1496.
125. Id.
126. Id. The lawyers for the Edwardses represented the other judgment creditors in
their attempt to lift the injunction. Brief for Petitioner at 8-9, Celotex (No. 93-1504).
127. In re Celotex Corp., 128 B.R. 478, 479 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1991) (Celotex I).
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the collateral securing the surety's obligation under the bond was proper-
ty of the bankruptcy estate." In addition, the court noted that the
bonds might also be important for Celotex's reorganization plan.1" The
court also emphasized the complexity and large volume of the tort litiga-
tion in which Celotex had been involved."3 For these reasons, the court
deemed it essential to bring "stability" to Celotex in the initial stages of
its bankruptcy.3 1 Toward that end, the court reasoned that its equitable
powers must be "absolute" in the initial stages of bankruptcy proceed-
ings." Accordingly, the court expressly stated that judgment creditors
could not seek execution on any supersedeas bonds posted by Celotex
without first seeking relief from the injunction in the bankruptcy
court. 
13
Shortly before the bankruptcy court issued its ruling clarifying the
injunction order, the Edwardses sought to execute on the supersedeas
bond posted by Celotex in the Texas district court." Celotex and
Northbrook both appeared in the district court in opposition to the mo-
tion to execute on the bond." When the bankruptcy court issued its
order several weeks later, Celotex advised the district court of the bank-
ruptcy court's mandate that judgment creditors seek relief from the order
in the bankruptcy court only." One year later, in spite of the
128. Id. at 481.
129. Id. at 481 n.7.
130. Id. at 482.
131. Id. at 483.
132. Id. at 484.
133. Id. The court decreed that "[w]here at the time of filing of petition, the appel-
late process between Debtor and the judgment creditor had been concluded, the judg-
ment creditor is precluded from proceeding against any supersedeas bond posted by
Debtor without first seeking to vacate the Section 105 stay entered by this Court"
Id. at 485.
134. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct 1493, 1497 (1995). The Edwardses filed a
motion under the federal rules that provides an expedited procedure for executing on
supersedeas bonds. Id. at 1496. The rule states "Whenever these rules... permit
the giving of a security by a party . .. each surety submits to the jurisdiction of the
court .... The surety's liability may be enforced on motion without the necessity of
an independent action." FED. R. Civ. P. 65.1.
135. Brief for Petitioner at 11, Celotex (No. 93-1504). Attorneys for the Edwardses
again argued that Celotex had no property interest in the bonds, and therefore, the
bankruptcy court lacked the power to prevent judgment creditors from executing on
the bonds. Id.
136. Id. at 14. Celotex also informed the court that the Edwardses' counsel had
participated in arguments in the bankruptcy court, had knowledge of the order, and
were bound by it. Id.
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bankruptcy court's ruling and without an opinion, the district court
granted the Edwardses' motion to execute on the supersedeas bond."7
Celotex appealed the order." Two days later, the bankruptcy court in
Florida issued another ruling affirming the supplemental injunction
against judgment creditors seeking relief to execute on supersedeas
bonds posted by Celotex in other cases." The bankruptcy court denied
relief from the injunction on the ground that Celotex's reorganization
effort would be fatally compromised if judgment creditors were permit-
ted to execute on the bonds.'" The court predicted that if judgment
creditors were permitted to enforce the bonds against the sureties, the
sureties would then seek relief from the injunction to obtain the collater-
al securing Celotex's reimbursement obligation.14 To alleviate the judg-
ment creditors' concerns, the court directed Celotex and the sureties
involved to take additional steps to preserve the judgment creditors'
rights to their judgments. 2 The court also instructed Celotex to file
within sixty days of the order any adversary proceedings attempting to
avoid or subordinate judgment creditors' claims as preferences" or
fraudulent transfers.'" As a result, Celotex subsequently filed adversary
137. Cdotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1497.
138. Id.
139. In re Celotex, 140 B.R 912, 914 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (Cdotex I).
140. Id. at 914-15.
141. Id. at 915. Specifically, the court argued that granting the judgment creditors
relief from stay to enforce the bonds against the sureties would "destroy any chance
of resolving the prolonged insurance coverage disputes currently being adjudicat-
ed .... The settlement of the insurance coverage disputes with all of Debtor's in-
surers may well be the linchpin of Debtor's formulation of a feasible plan." Id.
142. Id. at 917. The court required the sureties to institute escrow accounts large
enough to cover the bonds. Id. Additionally, Celotex was to initiate a reserve account
to cover the amount of the bonds and also to provide for full payment of all bonded
judgment creditors in its reorganization plan. Id.
143. Section 547(b) defines a preference in these terms:
[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor,
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would re-
ceive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made ....
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1994).
144. Celotex II, 140 B.R. at 917. Section 548 states:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in proper-
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actions against the Edwardses and over 200 other bonded judgment cred-
itors 14
5
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
ruling allowing the Edwardses to execute on the bonds without the bank-
ruptcy court's approval.'* Celotex argued that the Fifth Circuit's de-
cision constituted a collateral attack on an Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy
court and, accordingly, sought a rehearing by the Fifth Circuit sitting en
banc, but the court denied this request. 7 On May 23, 1994, the United
States Supreme Court granted Celotex's petition for certiorari in order to
resolve the conflict between the circuits.4 8
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE OPINIONS
A. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist began the majority opinion by reviewing the
Fifth Circuit decision that affirmed the district court's ruling to allow the
Edwardses to execute on the bonds. The Fifth Circuit determined
that the district court had jurisdiction to decide whether the bankruptcy
court stay applied to the Edwardses.IW The court reasoned that Celotex
lost all property interest in the bonds when the appeal became final and
therefore the bankruptcy court lacked exclusive jurisdiction over the
matter.' Next, the court concluded that the automatic stay did not
ty ... made or incurred on or within one year before the date of the fiing
of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily
(2)(A) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for
such transfer... and
(B)(i) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made...
(B)('i) [or] intended to incur... debts that would be beyond the
debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) (1994).
145. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493, 1497 n.4 (1995). Celotex argued that
due to the collateral securing of the bonds, the judgment creditors were indirect
recipients of preferences and fraudulent transfers. Id. Additionally, Celotex asserted
that the punitive damage awards could be "voided or subordinated." Id,
146. Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 6 F.3d 312, 320 (5th Cir. 1993) (Ed-
wards II), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995).
147. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1498.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1496-98; see Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 313-20.
150. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1497; see Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 316.
151. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1497; see Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 317. According to the
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prevent the Edwardses from executing against Northbrook, a third
party." Finally, the court disapproved of the § 105 injunction issued
under the bankruptcy court's equitable powers." The court asserted
that the bankruptcy court had no power to block the execution of the
bonds because the bonds were not assets of the estate."u Further, the
court feared that allowing the bankruptcy court that power would "glob-
alize the bankruptcy court's authority."" Moreover, the court stated
that the injunction was "'unfair" because it prevented the judgment cred-
itor from receiving the judgment it deserved even though the judgment
creditor had been promised the judgment through the supersedeas
bond." The court conceded that its decision directly conflicted with a
recent Fourth Circuit decision that upheld the same bankruptcy injunc-
tion against execution by Celotex's bonded judgment creditors.'57 While
noting the disparity, the court reiterated its contention that the assets at
issue were not property of the bankruptcy estate and further asserted
that Celotex's bankruptcy could not be permitted to "shut down the dis-
pensation of justice.""M The court contended that there was no collater-
al attack because the court's order merely protected the integrity of the
supersedeas bonds issued within the Fifth Circuit.w Finally, the Fifth
Circuit declared that it did not hold that "'the bankruptcy court in Flori-
court, the proper inquiry was "whether the district court's order implicates property
of the estate and therefore falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court or instead is considered a [sic] merely a related matter over which the district
court could properly exercise jurisdiction." Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 317.
152. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1497 (citing Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 315-17). The court
conceded that the automatic stay could, under limited circumstances, preclude actions
against third parties but nevertheless reasoned that Northbrook lacked the "identity of
interest" with Celotex necessary to afford the protection of the automatic stay. Ed-
wards II, 6 F.3d at 316. The court asserted that the definition of property of the
estate could not be so vast as to include the bonds in this case. Id. The court also
noted that other decisions clearly established the "separateness" of the obligations of
a nonbankrupt guarantor and the debtor. Id. at 318; see Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy,
Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the issuer
of a letter of credit satisfies its obligation with "its own assets and not from the as-
sets of its customer who caused the letter of credit to be issued"), modified on oth-
er grounds, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988).
153. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1497 (citing Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 318).
154. Id. (citing Edwards 11,,6 F.3d at 318).
155. Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 319.
156. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1494 (quoting Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 319).
157. Id. (citing Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 320); see Willis v. Celotex Corp., 978 F.2d
146, 149 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that, in accordance with an equitable injunction,
bonded judgment creditors were required to seek bankruptcy court approval to exe-
cute on supersedeas bonds posted by Celotex).
158. Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 319.
159. Id. at 320.
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da was necessarily wrong; we have only concluded that the district
court, over which we do have appellate jurisdiction, was right.'""e
After reviewing the Fifth Circuit's decision, the Court noted that both
Celotex and the respondents agreed that the § 105 injunction was intend-
ed to stay the enforcement of bonds like the bond at issue."6 ' The ma-
jority then reiterated the "'well established rule'" that a party who has an
irjunction entered against it must obey the order until it is overturned
even when that party has an adequate basis to object' The Court rea-
soned that this rule was necessary to accord proper "'respect for judicial
process.'"" The majority added that the rule barring collateral attacks
has been applied to protect valid bankruptcy injunctions."' In addition,
the majority pointed out that the Edwardses, while ostensibly arguing
that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction,
were actually arguing against the merits of the injunction."
In addressing the respondents' argument that the bankruptcy court
lacked jurisdiction to enter the injunction preventing enforcement of the
bonds, the Court briefly discussed the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional
scheme."M The Court stated that the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction to
enter an injunction barring execution on the bonds must fall under the
court's "arising in," "arising under," or "related to" grant 67 The majority
noted that both parties agreed that if, in fact, the bankruptcy court did
have the power to enter the injunction, such power must stem from the
"related to" jurisdictional grant's Although Congress had not precisely
defined the scope of the "related to" grant, the Court held that Congress
intended a broad jurisdictional reach for the bankruptcy courL In
160. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1498 (quoting Edwards II, 6 F.3d at 321).
161. Id For a discussion of the purpose and history of the supersedeas bond de-
vice, see Smith, supra note 104, at 607-08.
162. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1498 (quoting GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union,
Inc., 445 U.S. 375, 386 (1980)). Chief Justice Rehnquist also pointed out that the rule
is subject to exceptions when the issuing court lacks personal or subject matter juris-
diction and when the injunction has only a "frivolous pretense to validity." Id.; see
supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing development of the collateral
attack rule and exceptions).
163. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1498 (quoting GTE Sylvania, 445 U.S. at 387).
164. Id. (citing Oriel v. Russell, 278 U.S. 358 (1929)).
165. Id.; see Brief for Respondent at 19-48, Celotex (No. 93-1504).
166. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1498; see supra notes 43-103 and accompanying text
(discussing the development of the jurisdiction and power of the bankruptcy courts).
167. Cetotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1498; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 1334(b) (1994) (discussing
the jurisdiction of district courts under title 11 proceedings).
168. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1498-99.
169. Id. Some courts have reasoned that Congress did not intend to extend jurisdic-
1057
support of this ruling, the Chief Justice pointed out that the current juris-
dictional scheme was expressly devised to expand the bankruptcy court's
jurisdiction beyond the previously more restricted scheme.17 ° Specifical-
ly, the Court explained that previous schemes limited jurisdiction to
instances of consent or where the debtor had possession of property."'
The Court reasoned that the expanded view of jurisdiction, which serves
the policy interests of efficient resolution of bankruptcy related mat-
ters,m was properly applied in the Third Circuit decision Pacor, Inc. v.
Higgins.m The Pacor court determined that a proceeding is within the
"related to" jurisdictional grant when "the outcome of that proceeding
could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in
bankruptcy." The Court cited this case approvingly and asserted that
the Court also understood that in spite of the broad grant, the bankrupt-
cy court's jurisdiction could not be "limitless."m Although the Court ac-
knowledged that the circuits were split between the Pacor test and a
more narrow approach to jurisdiction, the Court declined to adopt the
Pacor test as the controlling standard.7
Applying the Pacor test to the facts in issue, the Court concluded that
the status of the bonds was an issue "related to" Celotex's bankrupt-
cy.'" The majority conceded that the execution on the bonds did not
"directly" involve Celotex; nonetheless, the arrangement between Celotex
and the surety, Northbrook, which involved the resolution of insurance
coverage disputes in exchange for Northbrook's posting of the bond,
provided a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. m Because immediate execu-
tion on the bonds would have, according to the bankruptcy court, "a
direct and substantial adverse effect on Celotex'[s] ability to undergo a
successful reorganization," the Court concluded that the issue was suffi-
tion to cover guarantors and other third parties on the ground that Congress express-
ly allowed for co-debtor stays in Chapter 13 but omitted such a provision from Chap-
ter 11. Credit Alliance Corp. v. Williams, 851 F.2d 119, 121 (4th Cir. 1988); In re Ar-
row Huss, Inc., 51 B.R 853, 856 (Bankr. D. Utah 1985).
170. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1498-99.
171. Id. The Court cited to legislative history for support. See S. REP. No. 95-989 at
153-54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939-40.
172. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1499 (citing Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d
Cir. 1984)).
173. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994.
174. Id (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see supra note 87 and accompanying
text (discussing further the Pacor "related to" definition).
175. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1499. The only specific limit on the scope of bankruptcy
jurisdiction that the Court identified was that "bankruptcy courts have no jurisdiction
over proceedings that have no effect on the debtor." Id. at 1499 n.6.
176. Id. at 1499.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1499-500.
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ciently "related to" Celotex's bankruptcy."7 Moreover, the majority not-
ed that Celotex's filing for Chapter 11 reorganization, rather than Chapter
7 liquidation, made jurisdiction more likely because "jurisdiction of bank-
ruptcy courts may extend more broadly in [a Chapter 11 case] than in [a
Chapter 7 case]. " Finally, the majority contended that its reasoning
with respect to the extent of the "related to" jurisdiction was in harmony
with recent cases from the appellate courts. s"
After ruling that the issue of the immediate execution on the bonds
was "related to" Celotex's bankruptcy, the Chief Justice addressed, in a
footnote, one of the dissent's arguments.' The majority explained that
although the dissent agreed that the issue was "related to" Celotex's
bankruptcy, the dissent argued that because the bankruptcy court lacked
the power to enter a "final order or judgment" in "non-core" matters, the
court lacked power to enter the § 105 injunction.' According to the
majority, this argument failed because (1) the injunction is not a "final
order" but rather is interlocutory in nature" and (2) the respondents
179. Id. at 1500. A "substantial adverse effect" would result because allowing the
bonded judgment creditors to execute on the bonds would induce the sureties to
seek relief from the injunction to reach Celotex's collateral, Le., the insurance cover-
age disputes would be re-opened. Id. The bankruptcy court feared that preventing the
resolution of the insurance coverage disputes would diminish Celotex's chance for a
successful reorganization because the settlement of those disputes "may well be the
linchpin ... of a feasible plan'" for reorganization. Id (quoting In re Celotex Corp.,
140 B.R. 912, 915 (Bankr. M.D. Fla 1992)).
180. Id. See, e.g., Continental IlM Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Ry. Co., 294 U.S. 648, 676 (1935) (allowing an injunction against lien enforce-
ment in order to promote reorganization, but noting that jurisdiction to enjoin en-
forcement of the lien would not be appropriate if the debtor was not attempting to
reorganize).
181. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1500. See, e.g., American Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche
Credit Corp. (In re American Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1989)
(allowing "related to" jurisdiction where action against debtor's guarantor would affect
the reorganization process); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-
Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that equitable powers can be
used to stay actions that will negatively affect the debtor's reorganization); In re A.H.
Robins Co., 828 F.2d 1023, 1024-26 (4th Cir. 1987) (allowing a bankruptcy injunction
barring suits against a debtor's insurers to stand).
182. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1499 n.7.
183. Id.; see ilfra notes 230-48 and accompanying text.
184. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1499 n.7. Arguably, this reading of the statute is consis-
tent with the Court's "plain meaning" approach to statutory interpretation. See Walter
A. Fffross, Grammarians at the Gate: The Rehnquist Court's Evolving "Plain Mean-
ing" Appmach to Bankruptcy Jurirpudence, 23 SrTON HALL L REV. 1636, 1639
(1993). The inherent conflict between the majority and Justice Stevens's dissent stems
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waived any claim to this argument by conceding in their brief that "the
'bankruptcy court had subject matter jurisdiction to issue orders affect-
ing the bond... if the proceedings on the bond were "related" to the
Celotex bankruptcy.' ""
In another footnote, the majority stated that the Court was aware that
a "technical" argument could be made that the proceeding granting the
injunction against execution on the bonds fell not under the "related to"
grant, but actually within the "arising under" or "arising in" jurisdic-
tion."M Chief Justice Rehnquist made it clear, however, that the Court
was not deciding that issue in the instant case. 7
Next the Court turned to the argument that the injunction could not be
permitted to interfere with the accelerated procedure provided for in the
Federal Rules" which the Edwardses utilized to execute on the
bonds." In support of this argument, the Edwardses cited a recent Su-
preme Court decision in which the Court disallowed a bankruptcy injunc-
tion against a regulatory proceeding." The Court, however, distin-
guished Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial from the instant
case. '9 The controlling factor in MCorp Financial was that a specific
federal statute prohibited any court from entering injunctions affecting
regulatory proceedings." 2 In the instant case, the Court explained, there
was no similar statutory prohibition against injunctions affecting the
from the fact that Justice Stevens's analysis also relies on the "plain meaning" of the
statute. See Ce/otex, 115 S. CL at 1505-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
185. Cdotex, 115 S. CL at 1499 n.7 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 22, Cdotex
(No. 93-1504)).
186. Id. at 1500 n.8; see In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 67 B.R. 746, 753 & m9
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding that an action seeking a § 105 injunction is itself a
"core" proceeding either within the arising under or arising in grant). As one scholar
has noted, this question has confounded courts and observers alike. Buschman &
Madden, supm note 45, at 923 n.70.
187. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1500 n.& If the Court held that the action to seek the
§ 105 stay was itself the jurisdictional issue, this might alter the analysis because the
bankruptcy court's powers in "core" proceedings are plenary. See 28 U.S.C. § 157
(b)(1), (c)(1) (1994); see also infui notes 230-36 and accompanying text.
188. FED. R Civ. P. 65.1; see supra note 134 and accompanying text.
189. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1500-01.
190. Id. at 1500 (citing Board of Governors v. MCorp Fin, 502 U.S. 32 (1991)). In
MCorp F/nancia, the Chapter 11 debtor, a bank, moved to bar the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve from going forward with administrative actions against
the bank. MCorp Fin., 502 U.S. at 34. The Court held that the bankruptcy court
lacked power to enjoin the Board of Governors due to a federal statute giving the
Board plenary power over its administrative proceedings and barring action by any
court to affect the Board's administrative proceedings. Id. at 38-39; see 12 U.S.C.
§ 1818(i)(1) (1994).
191. Cdotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1500.
192. MCorp Fin., 502 U.S. at 39.
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expedited execution on supersedeas bonds." Although the Federal
Rules provided an accelerated means for executing on supersedeas
bonds, it did not follow, the Court asserted, that the procedure could not
be enjoined by a "lawfully entered injunction."'
The Court then addressed whether the bankruptcy injunction had "only
a frivolous pretense to validity," and concluded that the injunction indeed
had merit."K The majority made clear, however, that the Court was not
deciding whether the bankruptcy court was correct in issuing the injunc-
tion; the Court had merely determined that the injunction was not "frivo-
lous."" In support of this determination, the Court noted that the
Fourth Circuit had upheld the same injunction on the merits in another
case involving Celotex.1 The Court further noted that the Fifth Circuit,
which allowed the collateral attack, had stated that the bankruptcy court
was not "necessarily wrong."" The Court then confronted the dissent's
claim that the injunction was "frivolous" because Celotex's motions to
set aside the bonds as fraudulent transfers or preferences were "patently
meritless."1 According to the dissent, these claims were "meritless" be-
cause the outcome of the motions could not affect the surety's duty to
the respondents.2 The majority dismissed this assertion, stating that
the argument was not "clear" enough to make the injunction "frivo-
lous."' To demonstrate the ambiguity, the majority pointed to authori-
ty (without explicitly vouching for the authority's validity or applicabili-
ty) "suggesting" that some debtor transfers that benefitted third parties
could be recovered from the third party.' Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that the injunction was not "frivolous.' °
In conclusion, the Court reiterated that valid injunctions must be "re-
spected" until overturned on direct review, rather than attacked collater-
193. Cdeotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1500.
194. Id. at 1501.
195. Id. at 1501 & n.9.
196. Id. at 1501.
197. Id. (citing Willis v. Celotex Corp., 978 F.2d 146, 149-50 (4th Cir. 1992)).
198. Id. (quoting Edwards v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 6 F.3d 312, 321 (5th Cir.
1993) (Edwards II) (internal quotation marks omitted), rev'd sub nom. Celotex Corp.
v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct. 1493 (1995)).
199. Id. at 1501 n.9; id. at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. Id at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




ally.' The majority emphasized that the Edwardses were wrong to at-
tack the Florida bankruptcy court's injunction in the Texas district court;
instead, they should have assailed the order in the bankruptcy court and
sought review from that court for any adverse decision.' To allow this
type of collateral attack, the Court concluded, would "seriously under-
cut[] the orderly process of the law.""
B. Justwe Stevens's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.' For Justice
Stevens, the constitutional and statutory differences between bankruptcy
courts and United States district courts were critical.'n The majority
erred, according to the dissent, by allowing a non-Article Ill bankruptcy
judge to enjoin the action of a constitutionally superior Article III federal
court.'s
The dissent began its analysis with a brief review of the history of the
case.21 ° Justice Stevens emphasized two points in this discussion: first,
the fact that Celotex lost any property interest it once had in the super-
sedeas bonds when the appellate court affirmed the judgment against
Celotex, and second, the fact that the payment of the supersedeas bond
was Northbrook's "independent obligation" to the respondents.2 ' Be-
cause Celotex's property interest in the bonds was extinguished by the
completion of the appellate process in favor of the respondents, the
bankruptcy judge had used his powers under § 105 to prevent execution
on the bonds.2" The bankruptcy court had justified this exercise of
204. Id. at 1501.
205. Id.
206. Id,
207. Id. at 1501-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1503 (Stevens, J., dissenting). United States district courts are created
under Article [I. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article II courts are characterized by judg-
es who are appointed for life and whose salaries are protected from diminution. Id.
The power to create bankruptcy courts, however, is derived from Article I, not Arti-
cle M. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cL 4. Bankruptcy judges are not afforded the
protections provided to Article nI judges; bankruptcy judges sit for 14-year terms and
their salaries are not protected. Id. The provisions in the Constitution regarding the
salary and life terms of Article III judges were meant to bolster the independence of
the judiciary. See Currie, supra note 54, at 442. For a discussion of the history of
the conflicts between Article HI courts and bankruptcy courts, see supra notes 43-103
and accompanying text.
209. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1503 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
210. Id. at 1502-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 109-48 and accompany-
ing text.
211. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1502 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
"independence principle" as it relates to similar secured transactions such as the
letter of credit transaction, see Gorney, supra note 106, at 335.
212. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1502-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (clting In re Celotex
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power on the ground that these other proceedings would imperil
Celotex's reorganization and that, consequently, the bankruptcy court's
power in these large cases must be "absolute."213 Justice Stevens criti-
cized the bankruptcy court's actions, especially its characterization of the
power of the bankruptcy court as "absolute" in the initial stages of a
complex bankruptcy, acting as if its power was "virtually limitless."214
Justice Stevens maintained that a non-Article III bankruptcy court's pow-
er cannot be "absolute" because it is limited by both constitutional and
statutory restrictions."' Justice Stevens noted, however, that even if the
constitutional and statutory restrictions were inapplicable, he would still
dissent on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the in-
junction and, in any event, the injunction had only a "frivolous pretense
to validity."
216
After reiterating its position that the bankruptcy court lacked the pow-
er to enjoin an Article Il court from executing on supersedeas bonds,
the dissent turned to its analysis of the majority opinion.2 17 Justice
Stevens agreed that the district court has broad jurisdiction over matters
"related to" a debtor's bankruptcy and that the district court can refer
"any or all" bankruptcy cases to the bankruptcy court for that dis-
trict.2" Justice Stevens further agreed with the majority that the pro-
ceeding to execute on the bonds fell within the district court's broad
grant of "related to" jurisdiction because executing on the bonds would
impede Celotex's reorganization."2 Indeed, Justice Stevens conceded
that enforcing all of the bonds that Celotex had posted would likely lead
to the failure of Celotex's reorganization efforts and would ultimately
Corp., 128 B.R. 478, 483 (Bankr. M&D. FI. 1991) (Celotex 1)). Although the resolution
of the appellate process arguably "extinguished" Celotex's interest in the supersedeas
bond, the statutory expansion of bankruptcy jurisdiction was designed to allow bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction beyond a property or consent basis. See S. Rep. No. 95-989, at
153-54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5939-40.
213. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1503 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Celotex I, 128 B.R. at
484).
214. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For an argument that an expansive approach to
bankruptcy jurisdiction and power under § 105 is necessary in the mass tort litigation
area, see Leal, supra note 103, at 497-98.
216. Celoterx, 115 S. Ct. at 1503 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 1493-1501.
218. Id. at 1503-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 1334(b)
(1994)).
219. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1503-04 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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require that Celotex be liquidated.' Nonetheless, Justice Stevens ar-
gued that the "specter of liquidation" was insufficient to allow a
bankruptcy judge to prevent a third party from carrying out its duty to a
creditor.221 Justice Stevens did, however, express his agreement with
the majority that the Celotex case did not mandate that the Court adopt
or reject the Pacor test for "related to" jurisdiction.22
In order to explain its contrary position, the dissent cited the statute
that outlined the jurisdictional structure of the bankruptcy courts and
proceeded to argue that the majority had failed to give the statute its full
meaning.' Accordingly, Justice Stevens discussed the historical devel-
opment of the jurisdictional scheme.'2 First, Justice Stevens noted that
the statute in its original form had been found unconstitutional by a
plurality of the Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.= The original statute, although it did not elevate bank-
ruptcy judges to Article III status, had given the bankruptcy courts broad
power to decide a wide range of cases related to a debtor's bankruptcy,
including claims based solely on state law.' Justice Stevens noted that
the scheme had been found unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed
a non-Article II judge to "entertain and decide" state law issues.' Con-
gress passed the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
19 8 4 ' to remedy the problem.'
For Justice Stevens, the dichotomy established by BAFJA between
"core" and "non-core" proceedings mandated his dissenting opinion.'s
Justice Stevens explained that under BAFJA the powers of the bankrupt-
cy court varied, depending on whether the issue before it was core or
non-core."1 A bankruptcy judge is entitled to "hear and determine" a
220. Id. at 1504 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. dL (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 1504 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens referred to the bankruptcy
jurisdictional statutes, i.e., 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), and 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), (b)(1), (c)(1).
Id.; see supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
224. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1504-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supva notes 43-103
and accompanying text.
225. Cdotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1504-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982)).
226. 1d. at 1505 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 54).
227. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91 (Rehnquist,
J., concurring in judgment)).
228. Pub. L No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
229. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1505 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), (c)(1) (1994)). For a
discussion of the core/non-core design and its constitutional ramifications, see Alec P.
Ostrow, Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 AM. BANKR. LJ. 91 (1994).
231. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1505 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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core proceeding, i.e., one "arising under" or "arising in" the bankrupt-
cy. In contrast, although a bankruptcy judge is empowered to hear a
non-core proceeding, i.e., a proceeding that is merely "related to" the
bankruptcy, only the district court may enter a "final order or judgment"
in the matter.m
Applying the "unambiguous" statute to the instant case, Justice Stevens
argued that the bankruptcy court's injunction in a non-core proceeding
was clearly impermissible because the statute permitted the court to play
only an "advisory" rather than an "adjudicative" role in non-core mat-
ters.' The extreme nature of an injunction, Justice Stevens asserted,
made it equally as "onerous as a final determination," and therefore,
subject to the constraints of the statute.' According to Justice
Stevens, the limits on the bankruptcy court's power were even more ap-
propriate when, as in this case, the bankruptcy court action was directed
against an Article m court'
In a footnote, Justice Stevens countered the argument that the bank-
ruptcy court's injunction did not constrain the Article Il court, but rath-
er constrained only the Edwardses' actions.' Justice Stevens pointed
out that the bankruptcy injunction applied to all "entities," which includ-
ed other courts.'s Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that even if the
injunction had not been expressly directed at other courts, the "practical
effect" of the injunction against creditors was to restrict the actions of
the Article m court' For Justice Stevens, the critical point was that
the bankruptcy court, which lacked the power to decide the issue, had
attempted to prevent an Article Il court with jurisdiction from act-
• mg.
To bolster his argument that the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction
to issue the injunction, Justice Stevens directed his attention to a provi-
sion in the jurisdictional statute providing for mandatory abstention in
matters "related to" a debtor's estate that are based on state law
claims.2" Justice Stevens noted that the bankruptcy court's injunction
232. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)).
233. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1)).
234. Id. at 1505-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 1506 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
236. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 1506 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
238. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
239. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
240. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 1506 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2) (1994)).
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had not taken into account the abstention provision. 2 The deference
that the abstention provision requires bankruptcy courts to accord state
courts also applies, Justice Stevens asserted, when, as in the instant
case, a federal court.sitting in diversity hears a state law claim.'
Justice Stevens emphasized that constitutional concerns were the basis
of his position that the bankruptcy court, which lacks power to "deter-
mine" an issue, must also necessarily lack power to grant injunctions
that bar actions by Article MI courts with jurisdiction over that issue.2'
Justice Stevens conceded that the injunction was only temporary, and
therefore not a "final order or judgment," but he claimed that the distinc-
tion was "irrelevant"' The cases that the bankruptcy court relied on
to support the injunction, Justice Stevens argued, actually supported his
position.' Justice Stevens also pointed out that the key differences be-
tween Celotex and cases where a bankruptcy judge had issued valid in-
junctions was that, in the latter, the funds at issue were property of the
bankruptcy estate whereas in Celotex, the supersedeas bonds were not
property of the estate.2" Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that the cir-
cuit court that upheld the injunction against Celotex's judgment creditors
had not addressed the constitutional and statutory concerns that he
raised.m
The abstention provision states:
Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim
or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising
under or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action
could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent juris-
diction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such
proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a
State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2).
242. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1506 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Cook, suprm note
85, at 17 (discussing mandatory abstention by district courts per 28 U.S.C. § 1334
(c)(2)).
243. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1506 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 1506 & n.11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 1506 n.ll (Stevens, J., dissenting).
246. Id, at 1506 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the
bankruptcy court in a core proceeding had the power to issue an injunction because
the property at issue belonged to the bankruptcy estate); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin
(In re A.H. Robins Co.), 788 F.2d 994, 997 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that the iWunction
at issue was granted by a district court and not the bankruptcy court).
247. Celotexr, 115 S. Ct. at 1506-07 n.12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Willis v. Celotex Corp., 978 F.2d 146 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
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Next, Justice Stevens addressed the majority's allusion to a possible
alternate basis for jurisdiction' The majority had referred to Celotex's
motions to set aside the posting of the bonds as fraudulent transfers or
preferences and also to Celotex's claim that the punitive damages ele-
ment of the award could, according to the Code, be subordinated to
other claims.' Justice Stevens admitted that these claims fell within
the "arising under" jurisdictional grant because Chapter 11 of the Code
created such claims. 1 Justice Stevens pointed out, however, that
Celotex filed these complaints after the injunction had issued, and there-
fore, they could not be used to "retroactively provide a jurisdictional
basis" for the injunction.' Additionally, Justice Stevens argued that
Celotex's claims were "patently meritless." 3 Indeed, Justice Stevens
declared that Celotex's attempt to set aside the bonds "strains creduli-
ty.' Justice Stevens conceded that part of the arrangement for the
bonds between Celotex and Northbrook might be avoidable, but he
claimed that issue was irrelevant to Northbrook's obligation to the
Edwardses.' Justice Stevens further criticized the idea that Celotex's
attempt to subordinate the claims for punitive damages might provide a
basis for jurisdiction'2 The dissent characterized this possible justifica-
tion for jurisdiction as not even a "colorable" contention257 Finally, Jus-
tice Stevens accused Celotex of pursuing these "frivolous" claims in or-
249. Id at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting; see id at 1497 n.4.
250. Id. at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 1497 n.4. The Code states that
the bankruptcy court "under principles of equitable subordination, [may] subordinate
for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another
allowed claim." 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (1994).
251. CeLotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1507 & n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334(b) (1994)).
252. Id. at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The bankruptcy court entered its order on
October 17, 1990, and Celotex did not file motions seeking to set aside or subordi-
nate claims until 1992, when ordered to do so by the bankruptcy court. In re
Celotex Corp., 140 B.R 912, 914, 917 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (Celotex I).
253. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
256. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R Co., 213
U.S. 175, 191 (1909)). Justice Stevens's strident objections stemmed from his view
that the outcome of Celotex's reorganization should not have had any bearing on the
surety's independent obligation to pay the respondents via the supersedeas bond. Id.
at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The timing of Celotex's motions to set aside the
bonds fueled Justice Stevens's fire. See id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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der to "manufacture" jurisdiction retroactively for the bankruptcy
court.2L 8
Justice Stevens then addressed the majority's contention that the in-
junction itself may have provided a basis for jurisdiction because the
power to issue the injunction was created by Chapter 11.' Justice
Stevens dismissed this argument as "bootstrapping." ® The bankruptcy
court's equitable powers under § 105 do not, Justice Stevens contended,
constitute an independent source of jurisdiction."
According to Justice Stevens, the bankruptcy court's injunction, even if
the court did have jurisdiction, had only a "frivolous pretense to validi-
ty." ' To explain, Justice Stevens again discussed the development of
the bankruptcy court's powers.'n Justice Stevens emphasized that Con-
gress, in the original bankruptcy act and again in 1978, had expressly
denied bankruptcy courts the power to enjoin other courts.' The 1984
amendments, in order to satisfy the constitutional objections embodied
in the Northern Pipeline decision,' eliminated the provision contain-
ing the express restriction on the bankruptcy court's power to enjoin
other courts.' Justice Stevens argued that because the amendments
were necessitated by the fact that the bankruptcy court had been given
too much power, it would be "frivolous" to argue that Congress had
intended to expand the bankruptcy court's power by removing the re-
striction against enjoining other courts.267
Justice Stevens conceded that, because the same injunction had been
upheld in another circuit' and because the Court was divided on the
issue, a reasonable jury could conclude that the injunction was not "friv-
olous."' Nonetheless, Justice Stevens distinguished the cases upon
which the majority relied in supporting the bankruptcy court's actions
because the central issue in those cases was not a third party's obliga-
tion to a creditor, as in the Celotex case.' As a result, Justice Stevens
258. Id. at 1507 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. Id. at 1508 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see i& at 1500 n.8.
260. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). As one observer put it, § 105 does not create
"jurisdiction to enter injunctions; rather it has been applied to define the scope of
the barnlmptcy court's authority in that area." Lal, supra note 103, at 491.
262. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1508 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. Id. at 1508-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1994)). The statute states
that bankruptcy courts "may not enoin another court" 28 U.S.C. § 1481.
265. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
266. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. Ld. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Willis v. Celotex Corp., 978 F.2d 146 (4th Cir.
1992).
269. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 1509 & n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see id. at 1501 n.9; American Bank
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surmised that the bankruptcy judge's mistake in issuing the injunction
was "sufficiently plain" to require affirmation of the circuit court's de-
cision."7
In the final portion of its opinion, the dissent offered two more rea-
sons why the bankruptcy court's injunction was "especially troubling"
and should have been overturned.' First, the dissent attacked as inad-
equate the bankruptcy judge's reasoning that the "emergency" conditions
threatening Celotex's reorganization necessitated the issuing of an injunc-
tion.' Justice Stevens argued that the judge had engaged in an ends-
justify-the-means analysis that the Court should have viewed more skepti-
cally.' Second, because supersedeas bonds put "the integrity of the
Court in which it is lodged on the line," attempts to enjoin their enforce-
ment in other courts are "suspect."'1 Consequently, enforceability ques-
tions should be answered in the issuing court prior to posting of the
bonds.2m Justice Stevens emphasized that the bonds were directed as a
protection for the creditor against the insolvency of the debtor, there-
fore, staying their enforcement as a result of the debtor's insolvency was
not only "inequitable," but also "bad law and worse logic."' Finally,
Justice Stevens intimated that the Court had allowed the bankruptcy
court to "trespass" on the district court's "domain" and questioned
whether the Court would allow a bankruptcy court to enjoin enforce-
ment of a bond posted in the Supreme Court itself.'
v. Leasing Serv. Corp. (In re Air Conditioning, Inc.), 845 F.2d 293, 295-96 (1lth Cir.
1988); Kellogg v. Blue Quail Energy, Inc. (In re Compton Corp.), 831 F.2d 586, 590
(5th Cir. 1987), modfied on other grounds, 835 F.2d 584 (5th Cir. 1988).
271. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1509 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
272. Id. at 1510-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
273. Id at 1510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
275. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see ifta notes 296-308 and accompanying text
(discussing the impact of the decision on issuance of supersedeas bonds and other
risk-shifting devices).
276. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1510 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 1510-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Southmark Corp. v. Riddle (In
re Southmark), 138 B.R 820, 827-28 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1992)*(internal quotation marks
omitted)).
278. Id. at 1511 & n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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V. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Celotex may have a significant impact
on several bankruptcy-related issues.2" Celotex's impact will be felt
principally in the areas of bankruptcy jurisdiction, but the decision will
also have an effect on the issuance of supersedeas bonds and other secu-
rity arrangements involving potential debtors.' 0
A. An Expansion of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction?
Celotex is generally viewed as an expansion of the bankruptcy court's
power.28 The decision is an expansion because the Court clarified that
bankruptcy injunctions are entitled to be respected and not collaterally
attacked.'s As Justice Stevens pointed out, this expansion is significant
in light of the bankruptcy court's status as a non-Article IlI court'8
Additionally, the decision expands the bankruptcy court's power, as-
serting that a proceeding against a non-debtor insurance company is
sufficiently "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy to come within the
court's limited jurisdictional grant.s The Court upheld the injunction in
Celotex even though the party opposing the injunction argued that the
surety's funds to pay the judgment were not property of the bankruptcy
estate.'S The evolution of bankruptcy jurisdiction can be viewed on a
279. John P. Hennigan, Jr., The Battle Between Winners and Losers Goes On: Can
a Bankruptcy Court Block Collection on a Bankrupt Debtor's Appeal Bond?, A.B.A.
PREVIEW. U.S. Sup. CT. CAS., Nov. 14, 1994, at 108.
280. Marvin Krasny & Kevin J. Carey, Bankruptcy Court Power Upheld by Justices,
Section 105(a) Decision Will Have Far-Reaching Effect, LEGAL INTELUIGENCER, Apr.
28, 1995, at 9. But see Conferences: Bankruptcy in a Changing World Is Focus of
Judges' Meeting in New Orleans, BNA BANIm. L DAILY, Nov. 13, 1995, at 23 (herein-
after Conferences) (arguing that "panic* regarding Celotex is "overblown" and that the
decision will be read narrowly).
281. Stephen Karotldn & Beth J. Rosen, Judicial Decisions Broaden the Bankruptcy
Court's Jurisdiction to Enjoin Conduct in Violation of an Automatic Stay, and
Limit the Availability of Non-Debtor, Third Party Releases Absent Notice to Affected
Parties. The Authors Analyze Recent Supreme Court and Circuit Court Authority,
REV. BANmNG & FIN. SE RVCES, June 28, 1995, at 12.
282. Krasny & Carey, supra note 280, at 9.
283. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1503 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
284. Id. at 1499. It is important to remember that the Court did not decide that the
bankruptcy court had acted properly in issuing the injunction; rather, the Court held
only that it had the jurisdiction to do so. Id. at 1501.
285. Id. at 1498-99. Similarly, other courts have recently declined to base jurisdic-
tion over "related to" matters on a "property of the estate" rationale. Leif Clark,
Bankruptcy, 26 TEx. TECH L REv. 357, 366 (1995). As in Celotex, the basis for juris-
diction instead rests on the existence of threats to the reorganization process and the
need to deal efficiently with issues surrounding the debtor in a single forum. See,
e.g., Coar v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 247, 248 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding
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continuum from the early days of bankruptcy law, where possession or
consent of the property was a prerequisite for jurisdiction, to Celotex,
where possession and consent are not required as long as the debtor can
articulate a threat to the administration of the bankruptcy estate.'
This trend in favor of broadening jurisdiction was responsible for the
constitutional defects in the jurisdictional provision that the Court identi-
fied in Northern Pipeline.' Today, more than ten years after Northern
Pipeline and the 1984 attempt to remedy the constitutional problems,'s
Celotex indicates that the extent of bankruptcy jurisdiction is still contro-
versial.2' In Celotex, however, the Court endorsed an approach to
bankruptcy jurisdiction that "places no conceptual limit" on the scope of
the bankruptcy court's power.' Nonetheless, the decision may lead to
inconsistent results due to the Court's failure to resolve the conflict
among the circuits with respect to the proper test for "related to" juris-
diction.2" In a circuit applying the broad Pacor test, which finds juris-
that an action against debtor's insurer was "related to" the bankruptcy because claims
asserted could exhaust the policy, thereby exposing debtor's other assets "unless the
claims against the policy were marshalled in accord with the bankruptcy proceed-
ing").
286. See Buschman & Madden, supra note 45, at 916; see also Clark supra note
285, at 366-70. One observer has noted that the amount of evidence required to show
a "cognizable threat" to the bankruptcy estate is unclear and that courts at times
exercise jurisdiction with only a "thin" showing. Id. at 366 rL56.
287. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982);
see supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
288. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-
353, 98 Stat 333 (1984).
289. Krasny & Carey, supra note 280, at 9. The Court implied that the scope of the
jurisdictional grant is unclear, referring to the legislative history rather than relying
only on the "plain meaning" of the statute. See Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1498-99. For a
discussion of the Court's "plain meaning" approach to bankruptcy issues, see Effross,
supra note 184, at 1747-58.
290. Holland Indus, v. United States (In re Holland Indus.), 103 B.R. 461, 468
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989).
291. Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1499 n.6, 1504 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Immediate
post-Celotex decisions by lower courts grappling with bankruptcy jurisdiction issues
have read the decision narrowly or distinguished it. See, e.g., Feld v. Zale Corp. (In
re Zale Corp.), 62 F.3d 746, 755 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the bankruptcy court
lacked power to issue an injunction barring claims against a third party insurance
company because the claims "are not property of the estate and . . .have no effect
on the estate"); In re Dow Coming Corp., 187 B.R. 934, 937 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (hold-
ing that claims against nondebtors were not "related to" the bankruptcy estate and
that the interest in judicial economy alone was insufficient to support bankruptcy
jurisdiction), rev'd, 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996); Duplitronics, Inc. v. Concept Design
diction whenever the outcome of a "proceeding could conceivably have
any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy,292 collateral
attacks against bankruptcy injunctions will rarely be permissible. On the
other hand, in courts that apply a more restrictive standard,ss collateral
attacks against injunctions may be more frequent because a party in a
non-Pacor jurisdiction will have a greater likelihood of convincing a
court that the bankruptcy judge lacked jurisdiction, and consequently,
that a collateral attack is permissible under the exception for lack of
jurisdiction.
It may also be the case that, as the Court hinted, an expansive grant of
"related to" jurisdiction is a practical necessity for Chapter 11 cases, and
more specifically, for complex Chapter 11 cases involving mass tort liti-
gation. ' Nonetheless, any increase in the scope of the bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction must be consistent with the constitutional limitations
articulated in Northern Pipeline, as emphasized in Justice Stevens's dis-
sent
B. Possible Impact on Supersedeas Bonds and Letters of Credit
Celotex may have a negative impact on the issuance of supersedeas
bonds in the future's because giving debtors power, even temporarily,
to halt payment on supersedeas bonds weakens the effectiveness of the
security device.'n Indeed, some members of the bankruptcy legal com-
munity greeted the decision with fear that the Celotex reasoning might be
applied to letters of credit.'s These fears may be unfounded because
Elecs. & Mfg., Inc. (In re Duplitronics, Inc.), 183 B.R 1010, 1016, 1019 (Bankr. N.D.
M. 1995) (refusing to block payment on a letter of credit and supersedeas bond post-
ed by a debtor and referring to Celotex negatively as making bankruptcy powers
-limitless").
292. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984).
293. See, e.g., Turner v. Erminger (In re Turner), 724 F.2d 338, 341 (2d Cir. 1983)
(requiring a "significant connection" to the debtor's bankruptcy for "related to" juris-
diction to attach).
294. Cdotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1500; see Leal, supra note 103, at 497 (advocating an
"expansive approach" to bankruptcy jurisdiction and § 105 powers in mass tort cas-
es).
295. See Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1503 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Currie, supm
note 54, at 441 (extolling the virtues of the constitutional ftamework for Article M
and warning against encroachments by lesser courts, specifically bankruptcy courts).
296. See Duplitronics, 183 B.R. at 1017-18 (noting that the bankruptcy court clearly
had the power to enjoin payment on a supersedeas bond or letter of credit but re-
fusedg to exercise that power).
297. See, e.g., Gorney, supra note 106, at 333-34 (arguing that depriving creditors of
the certainty of payment by the issuer would "weaken" an essential element of com-
mercial transactions).
298. Coqfewnces, supra note 280, at 23; see Gorney, supra note 106, at 333-34 (dis-
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the Court only held that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the
issue and explicitly did not rule on whether the bankruptcy court was
correct to issue the injunction under the facts.' Nonetheless, there is
no conceptual difference between a supersedeas bond and a letter of
credit transaction.a Some courts, even before Celotex, used the bank-
ruptcy court's equitable powers to block payment on letters of credit.3"'
Extending the reasoning of Celotex to include letter of credit transactions
concerns business persons who worry that diminishing the usefulness of
letters of credit will have a negative impact on national and international
commerce.an
Regardless of whether the Celotex reasoning is extended to letter of
credit transactions, diminishing the usefulness of the supersedeas bond
as a security device will have far-reaching consequences.' By allowing
payment on supersedeas bonds to be stayed due to a debtor's bankrupt-
cy, a long-established and efficient procedure for post-judgment stays
will be weakened.' The weakening of the bonds as a security device
might lead courts to require other forms of protection for judgment cred-
itors, such as requiring debtors to post a cash deposit with the court in
the amount of the judgment.' Requiring a full cash deposit may hasten
a judgment debtor's descent into bankruptcy, a fate that might have been
avoided if the supersedeas bond device was available and effective."
cussing the trend in favor of debtors seeking to enjoin payment on letters of credit
via a bankruptcy court's § 105 powers).
299. Ceotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1501.
300. Conferences, supra note 280, at 23.
301. See, e.g., Wysko Inv. Co. v. Great Am. Bank, 131 B.R. 146, 146-47 (Bankr. D.
Ariz 1991) (holding that payment on a standby letter of credit posted by a Chapter
11 debtor could be enjoined by the bankruptcy court).
302. Robert Jay Gavigan, Note, Wysko Investment Company v. Great American
Bank: A New Attack on the Usefuness of Letters Of Credit, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L &
Bus. 184, 204 (1993); see Joseph H. Levie & Alan . Christenfeld, Recent Cases Un-
dermining the Standby Letter of Credit, N.Y. L J., Feb. 1, 1996, at 4-5 (noting that
Celotex "comes close" to being a rejection of the "independence principle" and will
likely be used by debtors to stay actions against other guarantors).
303. See Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Associations of Trial
Lawyers of America, at *3, Celotex (No. 93-1504).
304. Id. at *3-4.
305. Id. at *4. See, e.g., Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp. v. Carter, 630 A.2d 647
(Del. 1993) (requiring cash deposit in amount of judgment in lieu of supersedeas
bond); Cardenas v. Owens Coming Fiberglas Corp., No. 94CA606 (Colo. App. 1994)
(same).
306. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, Associations of Trial Law-
yers of America, at *7-8, Celotex (No. 93-1504).
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Additionally, Celotex may affect settlement terms between plaintiffs and
defendants. 7 In any event, Celotex places the future of the supersedeas
bond and other similar risk-shifting devices in jeopardy."
VI. CONCLUSION
The holding in Celotex seems straightforward. First, the Court held
that injunctions issued by bankruptcy courts must be accorded respect in
all other forums and may not be collaterally attacked.' Second, the
Court held that the issue of whether a judgment creditor could execute
on a supersedeas bond posted by a surety for the debtor was a question
at least "related to" the debtor's bankruptcy.31 The holding seems sim-
ple enough, but what does it mean in the context of all that has come
before it? Celotex appears to mean that bankruptcy courts, even though
they are not Article Ill courts, have power very near the level of an Arti-
cle III court. In spite of the turmoil associated with bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion since 1978, Celotex places bankruptcy courts in essentially the same
position they occupied before Northern Pipeline."' The bankruptcy
court has broad jurisdiction to hear any proceeding that "could conceiv-
ably have any effect" on the debtor or the debtor's reorganization.312
The only limit on the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional reach is where a
proceeding has no effect on the debtor. Although the bankruptcy court is
ostensibly restricted from making "final judgments,"313 the ability to is-
sue injunctions that have such a far-reaching effect is not insignifi-
cant."4 When a debtor can articulate a legitimate threat to reorganiza-
tion or administration of the bankruptcy estate, it appears that jurisdic-
tion will lie. In Celotex, Celotex's judgment creditors lost because they
307. Id. at *5. For example, a defendant might use the threat of bankruptcy coupled
with the lack of protection for any potential judgment as leverage in obtaining a
favorable settlement
308. Id. at *3-6; see Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 115 S. Ct 1493, 1510-11 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
309. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1498.
310. Id. at 1499500.
311. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76
(1982) (holding that a bankruptcy court's assertion of jurisdiction over civil proceed-
ings arising under title 11 violates Article III of the Constitution).
312. Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d. Cir. 1984). Although the majority
in Celotex declined to adopt the Pacor test as the controlling standard for "related
to" jurisdiction, it cited the case approvingly, and the Pacor test is clearly the mod-
em trend of the lower courts. See supra notes 43-103 and accompanying text.
313. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (1994); see Celotex, 115 S. Ct. at 1505-06 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
314. Celotex, 115 S. Ct at 1506 nll (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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failed to respect the order of a bankruptcy court and because they stood
in the way of the further aggrandizement of bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion.
DANIEL MCCLOSKEY
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